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Households are constrained if they want to borrow, but banks restrict their lending.
This paper separately identiﬁes (using appropriate exclusion restrictions) the demand
for debt, and the maximum amount agents can borrow when it is unknown which
consumers are constrained. Using data from the CEX, it estimates that between 26
percent and 31 percent of households are constrained: and that poorly educated, ethnic
minority, low income, men, and (among for the educated) older households are less often
constrained. On average, households would like to borrow up to $4,000 dollars more.
But it does not test whether constraints are never binding.
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1It is widely believed by economists that at least some agents are credit-constrained. It is
oﬀered as one of the most important explanations for a wide-variety of phenomena that
are observed in economics, and also implicitly informs the policy debate, not only at the
macro-economic level in motivating ﬁscal and monetary policy, but it also motivates micro
policies such as subsidising university education for under-graduates, or supporting small
business investment. While credit constraints are widely seen as pervasive, little is known
about its incidence or importance. For example, while few black households borrow (as
will be documented here), there is considerable debate about whether this is due to their
low demand (as claimed by lenders), or to these households more often being denied credit.
This paper will study credit constraints and particularly investigates consumer behaviour.
It will demonstrate how to estimate credit constraints, even when all that is observed is the
amount agents borrow.
When considering how much consumers borrow, several questions may be of interest.
(i) Are there restrictions on the amount that consumers can borrow, that is, are at least
some consumers credit constrained? (ii) How many consumers are credit constrained? (iii)
How do credit constraints diﬀer with household characteristics? (iv) How much more would
these consumers borrow if unconstrained?
The approach taken in this paper is to brieﬂy characterize what it means for a consumer
to be credit-constrained, and then to use a very simple form of credit-constraints that the
literature motivates to answer some of the questions that are raised above. As will be seen,
a simple way to characterize debt holdings is to think of actual debt as the minimum of the
amount of debt that the household wishes to hold (the demand for debt), and the maximum
amount that any lender is prepared to lend (the supply of debt). While in this framework,
for reasons to be discussed below, it is not possible to test the ﬁrst of the questions that we
might want to answer, the other questions can be answered.
The paper starts with a brief review of the literature in section 1. This discussion is
restricted to the literature on consumption, and will help to motivate the rest of the paper.
Section 2 proposes an estimation strategy, and explains that identiﬁcation requires exclusion
restrictions on the parameters that enter the demand and supply equations. Estimation
must cope with two problems. First, whether a household is constrained is not directly
2observed, but must be replaced with some proxy variable that will be a function of observed
characteristics. Second, there is a selectivity issue since even if it was observed which
households were credit-constrained, demand (or supply) conditional on the household being
unconstrained does not equal the unconditional demand for debt. Having estimated these
equations, section 3 will then recover the estimated incidence of credit-constraints among
US households, and how this diﬀers with household characteristics. This section will also
discuss how to recover a measure of how much more credit constrained households would
like to borrow. The selection issue involved in estimation will also be important here as it
requires the construction of the diﬀerence between demand and supply, conditional on being
credit-constrained and the former can not be replaced by, for instance, the unconditional
demand for debt, without downward biasing the results.
The data used is a sample of over 7,000 households from the US consumer expenditure
survey for the years 1988-1993. The results show that between 26 percent and 31 percent
of households are credit-constrained. This ﬁgure is higher than several previous studies.
It also shows that credit constraints are more serious for single females, for well educated
households and for middle income households and for white households. These diﬀerences
across households are mainly due to demand, rather than supply. Additionally, credit-
constraints decline with age for college educated households but are ﬂat for poorly educated
households. State banking regulations that are designed to encourage competition have little
eﬀect. Constrained households would like to borrow as much as $4,000 more.
1 The Literature On Credit Constraints.
Ever since the seminal paper by Hall (1978) consumption economists have questioned simple
versions of the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis (PIH). That paper, and an enormous
number of succeeding papers, have rejected the Euler equation formulation for consumption.
Another strand of the literature showed how consumption tracked income over the life-cycle,
which again rejects simple versions of the PIH, for instance Carroll and Summers (1991).
A number of explanations for this have been suggested in the literature: one of the most
popular is that at least some consumers face binding credit constraints. These consumers
3would like to borrow more in order to increase their level of consumption, such consumption
is compatible with their life-cycle budget constraint, but for some reason they are not able
to borrow as much as they would like at the ‘market clearing’ interest rate. For instance,
Hayashi (1987) deﬁned consumers as credit constraints if either (i) “they face some quantity
constraint on the amount of borrowing”, or (ii) “the loan rate available to them is higher
than the rate at which they could lend”. The ﬁrst is often called credit rationing, and there
is a large literature, going back to Jaﬀee and Russell (1976), or Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
which motivates such credit rationing by lenders as due to the fact that some consumers
default on their loans, and there is imperfect information as to which agents will default.
The decision to default is not modeled. Nevertheless, such models show that it can be
optimal to restrict lending to consumers. Such models imply (see ﬁgure 1) that lending
takes place in discrete jumps: there are a countable number of ordered points (0,b1,b2,...)
between which lending takes place at a constant marginal rate of interest. At each of these
points bk, there is a jump in the marginal rate of interest charged (perhaps to inﬁnity, in
which case no lending occurs beyond bk).
A more recent literature has attempted to explicitly model the decision to default by
consumers. This literature aimed to explain the limited ability of consumers to pool risk,
and includes papers by Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996). In these papers,
the standard model of an inﬁnitely lived, utility maximizing consumer subject to a life-cycle
budget constraint is augmented by an additional constraint on the consumer’s behaviour.
This additional constraint explicitly accounts for the fact that ex post the consumer may
wish to default on his debt, and suﬀer any penalty which ensues. The punishment for default
could take many forms but these papers concentrate on default resulting in autarky, in which
the consumer is permanently excluded from both borrowing and lending. By solving these
models for a decentralised market economy these models can endogenously create credit
rationing in which the ability to borrow is restricted to some maximum level which depends
on the parameters of the model. Above this maximum level default is assured, and hence it
is never rational for lenders to allow borrowing beyond this limit. Such models diﬀer from
the earlier literature in that information is perfect, and in that there is only one interest
4rate at which lending occurs (if it occurs at all).1
Several papers have estimated the proportion of households that are credit constrained.
The simplest approach is taken by Hall and Mishkin (1982), who attributed the rejection
of the PIH model in Euler equations to a ﬁxed fraction of the population simply spending
their current income: this fraction was estimated to be some 20 percent of the population.
Hajivassiliou and Ioannides (2001) formalize how the Euler equation is aﬀected by credit
constraints, motivating their switching regression approach. Mariger (1987) tried to esti-
mate the eﬀective time horizon in the Euler equation and concluded that around 19 percent
of households were constrained.
One problem with this approach is that the rejection of simple versions of the PIH in
Euler equations could instead be due to mis-speciﬁcation of the Euler equation, a point
that is well known in the literature. Hence some papers have instead tried more directly
to estimate or test for credit constraints. The problem is that, denoting πi as a binary
variable taking the value zero if household i is unconstrained and one if constrained, this
variable πi is not directly observed. In much of the literature, some proxy variable has
been substituted for the unobserved latent variable. For instance, in a classic paper, Zeldes
(1989) splits households by their level of assets: low asset households (with a gross assets
to monthly income ratio of less than 2) are assumed to be credit constrained. He then
documents how low and high asset households’ behaviour diﬀer. Jappelli (1990) instead
uses self-reported responses to a question about credit constraints contained in the Survey
of Consumer Finances.2 The question asked if the householder had been rejected for a loan,
or if he had failed to apply for a loan because he feared rejection. In either case, having
chosen the proxy variable, the observations can be partitioned, and those who are thought to
be credit constrained can be compared to those who are not. When a suitable proxy variable
exists there is no need to estimate the incidence of credit constraints, but diﬀerent groups
1Two papers that test the eﬀect of punishing default are Gropp, Schulz, and White (1997) and Grant
(2000). They exploited diﬀerences between state bankruptcy rules in the diﬀerent US states. Grant (2000)
showed that moving to a state with a stricter punishment for default results in debtors borrowing $400 more
on average.
2Jappelli, Pishke and Souleles (1998) combines the Euler equation approach taken by Zeldes and Jappelli’s
more reliable measure of being constrained.
5can still be usefully compared. Jappelli (1990) found that about 12 percent of households
are credit constrained, rising to 19 percent if discouraged borrowers are included. He also
found that credit constraints are more often binding for low income, low asset, young, and
black households.
In many cases it is not clear what variable would be an appropriate proxy for credit con-
straints, a point made by Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng (1997). They use a switching regressions
technique in the Euler equation, and note that agents should react diﬀerently to increases
and decreases in income if they are at the margin of being constrained. Their technique
allows for constraints to be a function of several variables, and they ﬁnd that around 16
percent of agents are constrained.3 Gross and Souleles (2002) look at credit card balances
and limits, and note that consumers increased their borrowing in response to any increase
in their credit limit: they interpret this as due to credit constraints and argue that the
eﬀect of credit constraints on consumer behaviour is substantial.
Early estimates of the extra amount that households wanted to borrow, such as Hayashi
(1985) and Mariger (1987) found, by using an Euler equation approach, that credit con-
straints had little eﬀect on debts holdings and consumption. Cox and Jappelli (1993) study
a cross section of households and compare a group who are assumed to be credit-constrained
(based on responses to a question about having been turned down for credit), with a group
who are not. They ﬁnd that constrained households would like to hold over $8,000 more
debt than they actually do. Two other papers worth mentioning are Perrudin and Sorensen
(2000) and Duca and Rosenthal (1994). The ﬁrst considers a two stage estimation of asset
holding using the 1983 wave of the SCF, whereby a probit predicts which asset types are
held, while the second stage predicts how much of each asset is held. They ﬁnd that age,
marital status, education, and sex all have substantial eﬀects on both the type and quantity
of assets. In contrast, Duca and Rosenthal (1994) look at how liquidity constraints aﬀect
the ability of households to enter the mortgage market again using Jappelli’s ‘turn-down’
measure. Their model allows for selectivity by using a bivariate probit model for the hous-
ing choice and whether a household is credit constrained, ﬁnding borrowing constraints
3As in this paper, their approach imposes that the probability of being credit constrained is bounded
away from zero for the regression to be identiﬁed.
6particularly aﬀect younger households. They ask whether households borrow, but not how
much.
One problem is that even if it were known which households were credit constrained,
estimates of the demand, or other behavioural equations can still be biased. Estimates
of the demand equation based only those observations who are unconstrained (for which
πi = 0) are likely to under-estimate the true demand for debt among constrained households.
Those households with an unusually low level of demand, in the sense that they have low
error draws in the demand equation, are less likely to be observed to be credit constrained.
This selection problem must be accounted for when recovering a true estimate of how much
more credit-constrained households want to borrow than they are currently allowed. This
problem occurs when Cox and Jappelli (1993) estimate how much more households wish to
borrow, but is controlled for by Duca and Rosenthal (1994).
The next section is devoted to showing how to solve the identiﬁcation and selection
problem when no good proxy variable is available. It directly models credit constraints
in an econometric model, and discusses how this model can be identiﬁed. In particular,
credit constraints are not replaced by some proxy variable but instead they are modeled as
arising from some equation πi = f (Xi,εi) where Xi is continuous and multi-dimensional.
Furthermore, it is implicitly recognized that πi is observed with error.
2 An Empirical Framework
Theory suggests (recall ﬁgure 1) that consumers can borrow any amount up until some
limit at which the household is constrained. Both the amount that the consumer wishes
to borrow, and the credit limit are functions of the household’s characteristics denoted Xi,
where i denotes the household. Describing desired borrowing, y1i, as “demand” and the
credit limit, y2i, as “supply” then the supply and the demand for credit can be written as
functions of the households characteristics:
y1i = f1 (X1i,ε1i) demand
y2i = f2 (X2i,ε2i) supply
(1)
7where ε1i and ε1i are the unexplained errors, or stochastic parts of the demand and sup-
ply functions respectively. The actual level of debt observed, denoted yi, is deﬁned as the
minimum of supply and demand (or zero if this number is negative). These equations ex-
plicitly recognize that the econometrician does not observe all the characteristics that drive
demand or supply. For an agent to be credit constrained both demand must exceed supply,
and demand must be positive. This formulation makes explicit that credit constraints can
bind at some level other than zero, and that not all agents who do not borrow fail to borrow
because they are credit constrained. An alternative and parsimonious way of representing
the same result (ignoring the zero observations) is to write
yi = f1i + πi (f2i − f1i) + εi (2)
How estimation proceeds depends on what exactly is observed. The approach taken
by Cox and Jappelli (1993) assumes that πi is observed, or can be well approximated by
some proxy variable which partitions the data into those for whom supply is binding and
those for whom it is not. From those who are credit constrained (where πi = 1) the
supply equation can be recovered, while the demand equation can be recovered from those
who are not. In this case the extra amount that credit-constrained consumers wanted to
borrow is the diﬀerence between demand and supply conditional on credit constraints being
binding. The strategy highlighted replaces demand conditional on credit constraints by the
estimated demands from those for whom the constraints is not binding. However, estimation
must account for the selection problem: agents are only observed to be credit constrained
(ignoring the zero observations for the time being) if demand exceeds supply. That is, any
estimation strategy must explicitly recognize that
E (ε1i|πi = 0) 6= E (ε1i|πi = 1) (3)
and similarly for ε2i. Failure to account for this selection problem results in biased estimates
of f1 and f2 and thus mis-estimates how much more credit-constrained consumers wish to
borrow.
More often πi is not observed, and there is no good proxy variable to replace it. In
these cases the problem is that only yi is observed, but it is not clear a priori which of
8the underlying equations y1i or y2i has generated the observation. However, estimation can





min(y1i,y2i) y1i > 0,y2i > 0
0 otherwise
(4)
This involves using the estimated function πi = f (X1i,X2i,εi). Two comments are worth
making. First, while previously the proxy for πi was binary and one dimensional, this
formulation explicitly recognizes that many variables can aﬀect the incidence of credit con-
straints, and that such variables may be continuous. Secondly, it also recognizes that there
will be heterogeneity across agents that is not captured through those variables X1i and
X2i observed by the econometrician. This fact is captured by the addition of the error term
εi. The aim is to replace πi by a probability distribution which depends on the household’s
observable characteristics, rather than by some proxy variable. This probability depends
on the estimated parameters in the underlying supply and demand equations.4
A: Estimation by Maximum Likelihood
The framework discussed above, for which πi is not observed, is very similar in form to
standard canonical disequilibrium models, as discussed in Quandt (1988), and the discussion
is similar to that contained there. Estimation can proceed by full maximum likelihood. The
likelihood of any observation yi is thus
Li = Pr(yi|y1i,y2i ≥ 0;y1i < y2i)Pr(y1i < y2i|y1i,y2i ≥ 0)Pr(y1i,y2i ≥ 0)
+Pr(yi|y1i,y2i ≥ 0;y1i ≥ y2i)Pr(y1i ≥ y2i|y1i,y2i ≥ 0)Pr(y1i,y2i ≥ 0)
+[1 − Pr(y1i,y2i ≥ 0)]
(5)
where it is implicitly recognized that we are also conditioning on X1i and X2i. The ﬁrst
part of the equation represents the contribution to the likelihood function of those obser-
vations where debt is positive, and in which supply exceeds demand so that the household
is unconstrained. The second part represents those observations for which demand exceeds
4If repeated observations of the same household are available then a variety of diﬀerent techniques are
available, that can exploit the panel structure of the data. See for instance Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) or
Hajivassiliou (1987).
9supply, while the ﬁnal part represents those households who do not borrow. If we impose
that f1 and f2 are linear, and further assume that the error structure is bivariate normal

























and note that yi is observed, then it is simple to construct the likelihood function for this
problem. Although the exact form of the likelihood is given in the appendix, some technical
remarks need to be made. Consistency of the estimator follows from the consistency of
both the tobit model and of the canonical form of the disequilibrium model: for the later
Hartley and Mallela (1977) highlighted a number of conditions that are needed to ensure
the consistency of the estimator. The most important of which are (i) that the parameters
to be estimated are in the interior of the parameter space; and (ii) there exist exclusion
restrictions on the supply and demand equations. A third condition is that the fraction of
observations falling within each regime approaches a strictly positive fraction as the number
of observations approaches inﬁnity. These conditions translate directly to the estimator
above. The ﬁrst of these conditions means that the estimated variances σ1 and σ2 must
be bounded away from zero, and that the estimated correlation parameter of these errors
ρ must be bounded away from ±1. This is more onerous than might be thought: unlike in
the straightforward tobit model, it is not known, a priori, whether a non-zero observation
obtains from the supply or the demand equation. If the regression includes a constant, the
coeﬃcients on the parameters can always be chosen so as to make f1 = 0 in which case
the likelihood is unbounded as σ1 −→ 0 (similarly for supply). In practise this problem
translates into ﬁnding a suitable starting value that does not lie in the region in which
the gradient points to the boundary of the parameter space.5 The second condition means
that there must be variables that enter the supply, but not the demand equation, and/or
variables that enter the demand, but not the supply equation (e.g. X1i 6= X2i). This is the
identiﬁcation problem. Note however, that given such variables, other variables can freely
5This was done by using the estimated parameters from a tobit model as the initial starting values.
Kooiman, van Dijk and Thurik (1985) suggest instead employing some penalty function for getting too close
to the boundary, although it is not clear why this should cause convergence to the interior maximum.
10enter both the supply and the demand equation, and the estimated eﬀect on supply and/or
demand of the variable can be separately identiﬁed.
Which exclusion restrictions should be made? The exclusions in this paper are that
quarter enters demand and not supply, while bank regulation, and number of people per
bank in the state that year both enter supply and not demand.6 Are these restrictions
reasonable? Using seasonal dummies only in the demand equation argues that lenders do
not discriminate on the basis of which month borrowers ask for loans.7 If banks did, then
there would be incentives for borrowers to time their requests for debt at certain times in the
year, and since it is as costly to request a loan in one month as in another, it seems sensible
to suppose there is a pooling equilibrium on month. Furthermore, there is some evidence
that the federal reserve manages monetary policy to eliminate seasonality in supply: this
is a movement along the supply curve rather than of the supply curve, see Miron (1986)
or Barsky and Miron (1989). On the other side, the banking regulations are due to state
banking laws.8 These rules, tabulated in table 1, not only vary across states but also across
time, and it seems reasonable to suppose that they are unrelated to demand. The table
shows when diﬀerent states allowed intra-state branching, and highlights that there has
been a gradual relaxation in banking regulations over the last 20 years. The timing of this
de-regulation diﬀered from state to state, which can be exploited in the regressions that
will be run. The regressions will also include people per bank in the state as a proxy for
local bank competition.
6Strictly speaking, we only need either something in demand and not supply or something in supply and
not demand, and not both. Further to the exclusion restrictions reported above, some regressions are also
reported with additional exclusion assumptions.
7Note that this does not mean that debtors observed, or unobserved characteristics do not change month
by month, merely that banks do not use month in their assessment of whether to extend a loan to the
potential debtor.
8The rules used are a dummy for whether intrastate branching through merger and acquisition is allowed
(law 1) and a dummy for whether full intrastate branching was permitted (law 2). Including whether
interstate banking was also permitted made no diﬀerence to the regressions. These rules were obtained
from Amel (1993) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999) where a much fuller discussion of these regulations is
contained.
11The third condition means that at least some, but not all, households are credit con-
strained in the sample. Moreover, in reported regressions assumed that the errors ε1i and
ε2i in equation 1 are uncorrelated (ρ = 0), since convergence failed when this restriction
was not imposed. One interpretation of the error term is that it is due to parameters being
omitted by the econometrician from the regression, either because they are unmodelled,
or because they are not observed. For the parameters in the regression to be identiﬁed it
must be true that E (εji|Xji) = 0 for j = 1,2, the standard assumption in a regression.
However, if σ12 = 0 then this argues that any such omitted variable enter either the supply
equation, or the demand equation, but not both. While this seems unlikely, we hope the
imposition of this assumption will not aﬀect the results too strongly. If instead an omitted
variable increased (or decreased) both supply and demand, then this would cause a positive
correlation between the errors, in which case σ12 > 0, while if the omitted variable entered
the supply and demand equations with opposite signs, then σ12 < 0.
3 Data Description:
The data that this paper uses is the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX): a survey of
US households conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, primary for the purpose of
estimating inﬂation rates. Households are continuously surveyed about their consumption,
together with a number of household characteristics. Since 1988, households have also been
asked detailed questions about their ﬁnancial position, and in particular about all their
outstanding unsecured debts (including credit-card debts, debts on store cards, bank debt,
debts at savings and loans companies, debts at credit unions, debts with ﬁnance companies,
medical debts, and debts with other sources). This paper concentrates on unsecured debts:
the debt measure it uses is the sum all these unsecured debts reported in the CEX, and
excludes secured borrowing on mortgages. If households are constrained, it seems much
more likely that their unsecured borrowing is constrained, rather than borrowing to buy
collateralized assets. While households are interviewed 5 times (the survey is conducted
as a rotating panel in which one ﬁfth of households drop out of the survey each quarter,
and are replaced by a new household), questions on debt are only held in the ﬁrst and last
12interview. Only one of these interviews will be used since otherwise there are potential
correlations between observations when the same household is observed multiple times.
Other surveys of household debt exist, but there are a number of advantages in using the
CEX. The ﬁrst is the large sample size, which is important given the estimation strategy.
A second advantage is that the CEX survey contains information on the state of residence
of the household. This is crucial since the supply side instruments are the state level
banking regulations and the people per bank in the state. Few other surveys supply such
information. For instance, the Survey of Consumer Finances is perhaps a more natural
data source for information on household debt but it only provides state information for
1983. This means that changes over time can not be captured. Furthermore, since the
SCF is conducted over a month or two, month can not act as a demand instrument using
that survey. The CEX survey, by contrast, surveys continuously throughout the year, and
provides state information for all years that are surveyed. For the regressions the debt
was deﬂated by a household speciﬁc Stone-Geary price index (where the prices relate to
non-durable expenditure). As is common in regressions of consumption and borrowing, the
aggregate interest rate is included in the regression: we use the tax free municipal bond
interest rate.
The data used in this paper are those observations from 1988 to 1993 for which full
state information is available and who were ‘full income responders’. To ensure a reasonably
homogeneously deﬁned group, sampling was restricted to single households or those headed
by a couple, but excluding other more complex types of households. The paper also only
includes those households whose head was between 25 and 55. Large households (with 7
or more members) were excluded, as well as households whose head received no education.
Also excluded were self-employed households, those whose primary occupation as farming,
and those households in which more adults other than the household head (and his or her
partner) were working.
Table 2 summarises some of the features of the raw data, without conditioning on any
observable characteristics of the households. It shows that the median debt holding in the
whole sample is $736 while 68.0 percent of households hold at least some debt. Conditional
on holding debt, the average amount of debt held is $3,984, a substantial amount. While this
13may seem large, other studies, such as Cox and Jappelli (1993) have found similarly large
amounts. The table also compares the level of debt for each year. Except for the ﬁrst year,
the proportion holding any debt gradually declined over the period in question. However,
the average size of the debt was increasing, and there were particularly dramatic increases in
this quantity in 1991 and 1993. Comparing age groups shows that younger households are
more likely to hold debt than older households, and that median debt holdings are roughly
twice as large. The level of debt was for the 25-35 age group and was over $400 more than
for the 45-55 age group but $325 less than the middle aged group. The table also highlights
some other features of the data. Childless households are less likely to hold debt, and hold
less debt when they do by roughly $500. While there is little diﬀerence between households
with either one or two children, having three or more children results in around $100 less
being held, and 2-3 percent fewer households hold debt. The diﬀerences between education
groups is dramatic; the most poorly educated group is 25 percent less likely to hold any
debt, although when they hold debt, their holdings are similar to the middle two education
groups. The most educated group hold much greater amounts of debt, over $2,000 more
than any other group. Other comparisons show that unmarried households (either headed
by women or by men) and ethnic minority households are all less likely to hold debts, and
hold smaller debts when they do. Low income households are also much less likely to hold
debt. This may seem to suggest that those groups, such as unmarried households, black
households, or low income households have more diﬃculty in smoothing consumption since
they are less likely to use the credit markets, but of course it is diﬃcult to dis-entangle
supply and demand eﬀects from these raw numbers. The rest of the paper is devoted to
this issue.
4 Results
Table 3 displays the estimated supply and demand equations. Omitted from the table are
the coeﬃcients on the year dummies and a set of regional dummies. Results are recorded
for both the levels (in regression A) and for the log-levels (in regressions B, C, and D).
For the log-level regressions the left-hand side variable is the ln(1 + debt). All four re-
14ported regressions imposed that the errors from the supply and the demand equations were
uncorrelated. The results show that being married, getting older, and more education sig-
niﬁcantly increase demand according to the demand equation (quarter is also signiﬁcant).
Interestingly, black and male households have signiﬁcantly lower demand. In the supply
equation only marital status and having three or more children is signiﬁcant. Similar re-
sults are obtained when the supply and demand equations are estimated in log-levels, the
diﬀerence is that now three or more children enter demand but not supply, while education
enters supply. Age is no longer signiﬁcant in either demand or supply. This result moti-
vated regression C which not only includes a quadratic in income, but also interacted the
age polynomial with education. The motivation for this is the diﬀerence in the age-income
proﬁles for highly and poorly educated households: the steeper earnings proﬁle for educated
households may result in higher demand (and/or supply) for these households when they
are young. The results show that age now is important in the demand equation only when
interacted with education. By contrast, income is highly signiﬁcant in both the supply and
the demand equation. Lastly, in regression D, race and sex are removed from the supply
equation since it is illegal to discriminate between customers on these grounds (and in any
case they are never signiﬁcant). Moreover, since education may in practise be diﬃcult to
observe, it too has been excluded from the supply equation. The pattern of the results in
this regression is similar as in regression C: again race, education and its interaction with
income, sex, marital status, and income are all signiﬁcant in demand, while marital status
and income are signiﬁcant in supply.
The raw results are themselves not very easy to understand. However, having these
results allow examination of the questions that were outlined in the introduction. The ﬁrst
question was to test whether πi ≡ 0 , and as discussed in the appendix, is not investigated
in this paper but the other questions can be addressed by constructing the following:
(ii) E (πi)
(iii) E (πi|Xi)
(iv) E (y1i − y2i|πi = 1)Pr(πi = 1)
Item (ii) will give (assuming our observations are a random draw from the whole population)
15the fraction of households credit-constrained in the whole economy. One could also (but
have not) constructed the probability of being credit-constrained conditional on the current
level of debt. Ranging over all possible yi would enable a calculation of the ’maximum’
level of debt that a consumer is allowed to hold. Instead (iii) gives the probability of being
credit-constrained conditional on the X-variates. By ranging over the X-variates diﬀerent
subgroups can be compared to see if there are signiﬁcant observable diﬀerences across these
subgroups in their ability to borrow and smooth consumption. Lastly (iv) shows how much
more such consumers would have borrowed in the absence of binding credit-constraints.
A: The proportion of households that are credit constrained.
The proportion of households that are credit constrained is the unconditional expecta-
tion of πi over all households. For a household to be credit constrained the demand for
debt must exceed supply and demand must be positive. These two conditions will not be
independent, even when the supply and demand equations have uncorrelated errors. This
condition can be written as
E (πi) = Pr(y1i ≥ 0;y1i ≥ y2i)
= Pr(y1i ≥ y2i;y1i,y2i ≥ 0) + Pr(y1i ≥ 0;y2i ≤ 0)
= Pr(y1i ≥ y2i|y1i,y2i ≥ 0) Pr(y1i,y2i > 0)
+[1 − Pr(y1i,y2i > 0) − Pr(y1i < 0)]
(7)
Not all households that have no debt wish to hold debt, and at least some of the households
who hold debt would like to hold more. This probability can easily be constructed and more
details are given in the appendix. The variance can also be calculated, since the estimated
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, Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters from the
maximum likelihood function, while π0 is a vector of partial derivatives with respect to θ
evaluated at estimated coeﬃcients ˆ θ.
The results in table 4 suggest that the proportion of consumers who are credit-constrained
is 26 percent when the levels equation is estimated, and 31 percent when the equation sys-
tem is estimated in log-levels. These ﬁgures is slightly larger than is usually estimated.
16For instance, Hall and Mishkin (1982) estimate that around 20 percent of households are
credit constrained, a ﬁgure that is close to the 19.4 percent estimated by Mariger (1987).
Jappelli (1990) also estimates a ﬁgure of around 19 percent.9 One explanation of why this
study ﬁnds a higher ﬁgure than the self-reported responses contained in Jappelli (1990) is
that this paper will also include those households who were allowed to hold some debt, but
not as much as they wish to hold. His deﬁnition only included those households who were
rejected outright.
This number was constructed under the assumption that the errors ε1i and ε2i in equa-
tion 1 are uncorrelated (ρ = 0). This assumption seems implausible. One interpretation
of the error term is that it is due to parameters being omitted from the regression, either
because they are unmodelled, or because they are not observed. For the parameters in the
regression to be identiﬁed it must be true that E (εji|Xji) = 0 for j = 1,2, the standard
assumption in a regression. However, if σ12 = 0 then this argues that any such omitted
variable can only enter either the supply equation, or the demand equation, but not both.
This seems unlikely. If instead an omitted variable increased (or decreased) both supply
and demand, then this would cause a positive correlation between the errors, in which
case σ12 > 0, while if the omitted variable entered the supply and demand equations with
opposite signs, then σ12 < 0.
B: Diﬀerences across consumers.
As highlighted in the introduction, one of the advantages of the approach taken in this paper
is that diﬀerences across consumer types can be sensibly investigated. The ﬁrst question
that can be asked is are consumers with diﬀerent observable characteristics diﬀerently credit
constrained? However, the approach can go further than that: it can also investigate the
reason for these diﬀerences across consumers. For instance, are these diﬀerences being
driven by diﬀerences in the supply of loans, or by diﬀerences in the demand for loans?
Two objects are of interest; the level of credit constraints for households with a given
characteristic, or the marginal eﬀect of a given characteristic on the level of credit constraint
holding everything else constant. The ﬁrst is reported in table 4, and shows that single
households headed by men are much less likely to be constrained than single households
9The diﬀerent results may partly reﬂect the later period that is studied here.
17headed by women, while households headed by a couple (at least when the equation is
estimated in logs) are somewhere in between. Those households who did not complete school
are much less likely to be constrained, as are black households, while the number of children
makes little diﬀerence. In regressions C and D, the poorest households are much less likely
to be constrained, only 14 percent of those whose income is around $1000. This ﬁgure rises
until income reaches $6,400 and is then ﬂat above this. Looking at age in regressions A and
B shows that credit constraints fall by a third between the ages of 25 and 55. Regressions
C and D divide the sample into those who completed at least two years of college and
those who did not. For the poorly educated households, the age proﬁle is approximately
ﬂat, while the tables shows there were large declines in credit constraints among the more
highly educated households. Notice however that credit constraints nevertheless remain
high among older households.
Table 5 reports the marginal eﬀect of characteristics on credit constraints, while table
6 reports the median level of demand and of supply conditional on the X-variates. In
calculating the eﬀect of being male or female for instance, all other variables were ﬁxed at
their observed level in the data and then the variable of interest was set ﬁrst to male, and
then to female. And similarly for the other variables.
According to table 5 women are again much more likely to be constrained than men,
but the eﬀect is less dramatic than before. This is also true for the less well educated, for
black households and when comparing across age groups. Interestingly, the very poorest
households are the least likely to be constrained: the results in table 4 were because these
households other characteristics made them very likely to be denied credit. Table 6 high-
lights that while the supply of credit is marginally lower, at most $120 lower in regression
B, their demand is signiﬁcantly higher, perhaps, as in regression C, by over $1,000. The
table also shows that while supply is around $300 higher for couples, demand is higher
than for men, and only marginally lower than for women. This contributes to the lower
incidence of credit constraints among married couples. Regressions A and B show that
the marginal incidence of credit constraints declines with age: table 6 shows that while
supply falls gently with age, demand falls much more rapidly. Regression C shows that the
slope of the supply curve is slightly steeper for college educated households, but that the
18slope of the demand curve, while fairly ﬂat in both regression C and D for poorly educated
households, for college educated households there is a large decline in demand between ages
25 and 55. This results in the incidence of credit constraints falling dramatically with age
for these households. When diﬀerences in income are compared, table 5 shows that poor
households are less likely to be constrained, but that beyond an income of $19,000 that the
incidence of credit constraints are ﬂat (and may even decline slightly). Table 6 shows that
the demand for credit increases with income until it is around $19,000, and is especially
low for the poorest households, supply is reasonably ﬂat for lower income households, but
increases rapidly for the richest households.
C: The demand for debt among credit-constrained households
The previous discussion investigated the extent of credit rationing among US households.
However, a complete discussion will also consider how important rationing is for these
consumers. In the absence of rationing how much more would households borrow? If the
extra amount of debt that households wish to borrow is denoted ∆ then the problem is to
construct some estimate of10:
E (∆i) = E (∆|πi = 1)Pr(πi = 1) + E (∆|πi = 0)Pr(πi = 0) (8)
But by construction, the household can borrow as much as it likes if it is not credit con-
strained hence ∆i = 0 whenever πi = 0, and this term drops out. Moreover, For the last
term term y2i = yi whenever πi = 1, and yi is observed, thus
E (∆i) = Pr(πi = 1)[E (y1i|πi = 1) − yi] (9)
The problem is to ﬁnd some good proxy or estimate of the ﬁrst part of equation 9. One
approach, prevalent in the literature (see for instance Cox and Jappelli, 1993), is to replace
E (y1i|π1 = 1) by E (y1i|π1 = 0). However, even if the estimate of E (y1i|π1 = 0) is consis-
tently estimated, using this in equation 9 will result in downward biased estimates of ∆i.
10It should be understood that we are conditioning on all the observed characteristics of the agent, and
on the observed level of borrowing, although the notation has suppressed this.
19This is because (ignoring the zero observations).
E (y1i|π1 = 1) = E (y1i|y1i > y2i)
> E (y1i|y2i > y1i)
A naive estimation strategy would thus under-estimate the true impact of credit-constraints
on households. Instead construction of the diﬀerence entails allowing for the selectivity
problem that this highlights. Given that f1 and f2 have both been estimated, then the




(y1i − yi)Pr(y1i|πi = 1)dy1i
where
Pr(y1i|πi = 1) = Pr(y1i|y1i > y2i > 0) + Pr(y1i|y1i > 0;y2i < 0)
and in the case of uncorrelated errors this becomes:











which can be recovered. Construction of this results in an estimate of E (∆i), see table 7, of
$1,655 dollars for the level regression, and around $4,000 for the three log-level regressions.
That is, in the absence of credit constraints, households would, on average, borrow over
one and a half thousand more unsecured dollars than they currently do (or roughly $4,000
for the log-level equations). This number is large given that the average amount of debt
households hold is $2,733.
The results also show that this problem is particularly acute for college educated house-
holds, and for married or female households. It is also much more serious for younger
households, especially for college educated and younger households (by contrast age has lit-
tle aﬀect among non-college households). Poor and black households are much less seriously
aﬀected in terms of how much extra they wish to borrow (although this smaller ﬁgure may
be a larger proportion of their permanent income and hence more serious in utility terms).
205 Conclusion
The paper described how it was possible to estimate a model in which some consumers
were credit-constrained, even though it was not known which consumers were constrained.
Estimation also addressed the selectivity problem: demand (or supply) conditional on being
constrained does not equal the unconditional demand. Using the strategy proposed in the
main body of the paper, the demand for debt and the supply of debt were separately
identiﬁed and estimated. From this the paper recovered the incidence of credit-constraints
among households, estimated to be between about 26 percent and about 31 percent in the
population as a whole.
The paper found that sex, education, income, and race dramatically changed the inci-
dence of credit-constraints, as well as age, at least for college educated households. In fact,
the proﬁle of a credit constrained household would be a single white female college graduate
who has just started their ﬁrst well-paid job. By contrast, a black male high school drop-out
is far less likely to be constrained. Recall that poor and black households recorded a lower
level and incidence of debt: this paper shows that this is overwhelmingly a demand, rather
than a supply eﬀect. One explanation is that the likely earnings proﬁle of these households
is ﬂat, rather than increasing with age, and hence they do not wish to anticipate their fu-
ture earnings. However, there is a steep decline in the demand for debt with age for college
graduates. Two notes of caution should be made. First, poor households may be borrowing
in markets that are not recorded in the CEX (for instance by borrowing through friends
or using pawn dealers for instance). Secondly, the estimation strategy imposes that there
are no ﬁxed costs to asking for a loan (and hence no discouraged borrowers); if there were
substantial ﬁxed costs, then this would relatively reduce the estimated demand for small
loans (typically given to poorer households). The justiﬁcation for this important assump-
tion is that modern credit scoring techniques, and the fact that almost all adults have a
record with the major US credit bureaus, suggests that the costs to the bank of making a
credit check on any potential customer is negligible (at most a few cents). Hence this paper
claims this key assumption is reasonable.
Overall, the paper shows how three of the questions that were raised in the introduction
can be answered and, in the appendix, it explains why it is not practically possible to answer
21the ﬁrst of the four questions. The results are perhaps a little surprising, and show that
credit constraints may be more pervasive than is commonly thought. Moreover, the paper
also demonstrates that looking at the level and incidence of debt among various groups
in society can be very misleading when investigating who is and who is not constrained.
The incidence is not only higher among middle income, and college educated households,
the degree to which the constraints reduce their borrowing is also much larger. However,
although poorer households may not want to borrow much more, this extra amount may
have more serious utility implications: the marginal utility of $500 dollars to someone
earning only $1,000 may be much higher than the marginal utility of $4,000 to someone
earning $50,000 dollars.
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di ln(h1ih2i + h3ih4i) + (1 − di)ln(h5i)
where di is an indicator function for observing a non-zero debt holding, that is:
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and where k1i =
β0
1X1i
σ1 , k2i =
β0
2X2i
σ2 , and Φ(·) is the usual c.d.f. of the normal distribution
and the correlation of the errors is deﬁned as ρ = σ12
σ1σ2.
The intuition is straightforward: non-zero observations may either have been generated
by the demand equation or by the supply equation. If generated by the demand equation,
then h1i represents the p.d.f. of the observation, given that it is generated by the demand
equation, while h2i represents the probability that demand is exceeded by supply. The
converse is represented by h3i and h4i. Finally, the term h5i is the standard bivariate
normal c.d.f. and represents the probability that either supply or demand is less than or
equal to zero.11 If the correlation between the errors is identically equal to zero (in which
case ρ ≡ 0) then h2i and h4i simplify in the obvious way, while h5i becomes:










Results will be presented for this simpler framework.
11See Johnson and Kotz (1972) for a general discussion of the derivation of these equations.
26Testing for credit constraints
It would be useful to test the system of equations in our model against an appropriate
market clearing model. However, the following discussion will explain that this is not
practically possible. In a market clearing model, the supply and demand equations jointly
determine the level of borrowing, and there are no parameter restrictions implied by the
model. Thus conventional tests are not appropriate, something that has been known at
least since Hwang (1980).12 To illustrate the argument, suppose, for the time being, the
zero observations were ignored. As speciﬁed in equation 1 the model to be estimated takes
the form13:
y1i = f1 (X1i,β1) + ε1i i ∈ Ω1
y2i = f2 (X2i,β1) + ε2i i ∈ Ω2 ≡ Ω\Ω1
where Ω1 and Ω2 partition observations between regimes and Ωj ∈ Θ where Θ is the space of
all possible partitions. That is, Ω2 represents those agents who are credit constrained, while
Θ represents all the possible ways of selecting credit constrained households. By making
appropriate assumptions about the parameters this system of equations can be estimated
in a variety of ways, including FIML, SML, GMM, and MD. In the main part of the paper,
the equations have been linearized, and then estimated by maximum likelihood. Estimation
comprises both estimating ˆ f1 and ˆ f2, and estimating ˆ Ωi. Having derived some estimate of
f1 and f2 the challenge is to test the estimated model against some alternative model in
which nobody is ever credit constrained (or agents are always credit constrained). In such
a model the system of equations reduces to only one equation. That is, all observations will
fall into only one of the regimes, f1 say. The null and alternative hypotheses can thus be
written:
H0 : βi = β ∀i








12He suggested a cusum or cusum of squares test on the residuals from the market clearing model but
noted the poor power of the test in large samples.
13For the purposes of this discussion we will ignore the observations in which no borrowing occurs.
27Let πi denote an indicator function for observation i belonging to the ﬁrst regime14: πi =
I [y2i − y1i ≥ 0]. (And let π be the stacked vector of πi’s.) In which case the system of
equations can be re-written in the following way.
yi = f1i + πi (f2i − f1i) + ε1i + πi (ε2i − ε1i) (10)
From this it is immediately apparent that there is a problem with testing the parameters
of the model. Suppose that the aim was to test whether all observations were generated
by the ﬁrst equation (i.e. that credit constraints are never binding). Equivalently this can
be interpreted as either πi identically equals zero, or f2i − f1i identically equals zero. The
problem is that if Ω2 = φ (the empty set) then πi and f2i−f1i are not separately identiﬁable.
If the null hypothesis had generated the data, then it becomes problematic to test against
the alternative hypothesis.
A literature has recently developed which has explored ways of testing such models which
are contaminated by nuisance parameters that only exist under the alternative hypothesis.
If π where known, then testing the model would simply be a matter of constructing Wald,
LR-, or LM- statistics and comparing the test statistic against a standard chi-squared
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the dimension of β. However, π is not known.
Since it is derived in a way that is dependent on the data, the Wald (similarly LR-, and LM-)
statistic based on this estimated π will no longer have a standard distribution: instead the
null hypothesis will be over-rejected. This could lead to the mistaken conclusion that some
agents suﬀer binding credit constraints. The existing literature (see for instance Andrews
1993) has developed tests for cases when the data is naturally ordered, but they can not
practically be implemented here. To bootstrap the distribution of the Wald-statistic, as
this literature suggests, would take an infeasible amount of time.
14This deﬁnition can be reconciled with the earlier deﬁnition of π if we note that now we are ignoring the
zero observations.Table 1: When US states deregulated and relaxed state banking regulations.
State intrastate branching full intrastate State intrastate branching full intrastate
through M & A branching through M & A branching
Alabama 1981 1990 Minnesota 1993 -
Alaska 1970 1970 Miss. 1986 1989
Arizona 1970 1970 Missouri 1990 1990
Arkansas 1994 - Nebraska 1985 -
California 1970 1970 Nevada 1970 1970
Colorado 1991 - New Hamp. 1987 1987
Connect. 1980 1988 New Jersey 1977 -
Delaware 1970 1970 New Mexico 1991 1991
D.C 1970 1970 New York 1976 1976
Florida 1988 1988 N. Carolina 1970 1970
Georgia 1983 - Ohio 1979 1989
Hawaii 1986 1986 Oklahoma 1988 -
Idaho 1970 1970 Oregon 1985 1985
Illinois 1988 1993 Penn. 1982 1990
Indiana 1989 1991 S. Carolina 1970 1970
Iowa - - S. Dakota 1970 1970
Kansas 1987 1990 Tenn. 1985 1990
Kentucky 1990 - Texas 1988 1988
Louisiana 1988 1988 Utah 1981 1981
Maine 1975 1975 Vermount 1970 1970
Maryland 1970 1970 Virginia 1978 1987
Mass. 1984 1984 Washington 1985 1985
Michigan 1987 1988 W. Virginia 1987 1987
Wisconsin 1990 1990









Figure 1: The marginal rate of interest as debt increases.Table 2: Some summary statistics on debt-holding among US households.
median debt ratio holding debt mean debt∗
($) (%) ($)
All 736 68.0 3,984
1988 671 68.0 4,035
1989 865 71.9 3,748
1990 778 69.0 4,015
1991 777 68.4 4,192
1992 741 67.2 3,757
1993 554 64.1 4,176
Age 25-35 939 71.0 3,974
Age 35-45 732 67.7 4,301
Age 45-55 385 61.7 3,552
No Children 522 65.3 3,784
1 Child 1,019 71.5 4,249
2 Children 1,063 72.0 4,097
3-4 Children 939 69.1 4,362
some school 0 46.7 3,638
ﬁnished high school 657 67.3 3,388
some college 936 71.7 3,679
university degree 918 71.7 4,700
white 809 69.7 3,999
black 209 55.8 3,849
single male 164 55.8 3,750
single male 583 70.1 3,225
married 964 70.8 4,197
income ≤ 6,400 0 36.7 4,488
income 6,400-32,000 486 64.8 3,322
income ≥ 32,000 1,158 73.9 4,486
∗Conditional on holding at least some debt. The table is constructed using the CEX.Table 3: Estimated debt equations, in $1,000’s (standard errors in parenthesis).
parameter A B C D
demand supply demand supply demand supply demand supply
constant -7.496 1.824 -0.242 0.919 -0.084 0.895 -0.156 0.984
(1.030) (0.174) (0.165) (0.130) (0.166) (0.136) (0.119) (0.088)
female 2.456 -0.042 0.491 -0.045 0.492 -0.018 0.474 -
(0.597) (0.092) (0.102) (0.063) (0.100) (0.063) (0.083)
married 3.984 0.240 0.459 0.224 0.338 0.102 0.340 0.098
(0.500) (0.083) (0.082) (0.061) (0.083) (0.064) (0.079) (0.054)
age -0.202 -0.055 -0.031 -0.031 -0.139 -0.008 -0.122 -0.051
(0.449) (0.073) (0.073) (0.053) (0.117) (0.091) (0.103) (0.053)
age2 -0.323 -0.006 -0.014 -0.025 0.013 -0.034 0.013 -0.027
(0.252) (0.041) (0.040) (0.030) (0.062) (0.047) (0.056) (0.029)
age3 -0.588 -0.019 -0.071 -0.007 0.053 -0.002 0.065 0.017
(0.295) (0.048) (0.048) (0.034) (0.077) (0.058) (0.068) (0.034)
High school 5.262 -0.028 0.596 0.068 0.493 0.055 0.510 -
(0.570) (0.095) (0.091) (0.079) (0.093) (0.081) (0.078)
Some college 6.274 0.086 0.739 0.136 0.613 0.044 0.625 -
(0.586) (0.072) (0.094) (0.079) (0.113) (0.095) (0.098)
College degree 7.155 0.017 0.746 0.167 0.573 0.054 0.587 -
(0.542) (0.093) (0.087) (0.077) (0.109) (0.095) (0.093)
age × College - - - - 0.203 -0.067 0.180 -
(0.147) (0.111) (0.123)
age2 × College - - - - -0.020 0.008 -0.015 -
(0.078) (0.059) (0.065)
age3 × College - - - - -0.218 -0.024 -0.243 -
(0.098) (0.073) (0.082)
non-white -2.830 0.003 -0.370 -0.017 -0.302 -0.010 -0.306 -
(0.445) (0.080) (0.071) (0.062) (0.072) (0.063) (0.061)
one child 0.064 0.070 -0.019 0.071 -0.009 0.079 -0.000 0.063
(0.517) (0.080) (0.082) (0.061) (0.078) (0.062) (0.078) (0.062)
two children -0.158 0.067 0.024 0.020 0.036 -0.015 0.047 -0.039
(0.499) (0.077) (0.081) (0.058) (0.079) (0.059) (0.078) (0.058)
3-4 children -0.274 0.166 -0.031 0.059 0.003 0.061 0.011 0.041
(0.610) (0.094) (0.097) (0.075) (0.095) (0.076) (0.094) (0.075)
income - - - - 0.218 0.236 0.219 0.239
(0.037) (0.032) (0.036) (0.030)
income2 - - - - -0.118 0.008 -0.114 0.088
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
interest rate -0.033 -0.008 0.004 -0.007 0.004 -0.012 0.028 -0.021
(0.167) (0.026) (0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
law 1 - -0.040 - -0.001 - -0.003 - -0.001
(0.091) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058)
law 2 - -0.062 - -0.045 - -0.037 - -0.010
(0.072) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046)
All regressions included a constant, year, and the instruments (quarter in the demand equation; law 1 and
law 2, allowing intra-state bank branching through mergers and acquisition and allowing full intra-state
branching respectively, and people per bank in the state in the supply equation). Income is log-income,
high-school refers to completed high school, ‘age’ refers to (age-40)/10, while the interest rate is the tax free
municipal bond interest rate. Column A is estimated in levels, while the other columns are estimated in
log-levels.Table 4: The Incidence of credit constraints by type of household.
Subgroup A B C D
constr. s.e. constr. s.e. constr. s.e. constr. s.e.
(%) (%) (%) (%)
All 25.96 0.45 31.61 0.30 31.36 0.51 31.44 0.51
Men 19.29 0.85 25.13 0.97 25.65 25.74 0.82
Women 24.96 1.18 36.47 1.27 37.43 1.28 36.97 1.12
Married 28.00 0.51 32.05 0.47 31.6 1.00 31.79 0.48
Some School 12.28 0.87 18.35 1.06 19.80 1.26 18.92 0.80
Compl. school 24.84 0.77 31.07 0.79 31.45 0.82 31.02 0.67
Some College 27.17 0.79 33.63 0.75 34.05 0.77 34.49 0.66
College degree 29.75 0.69 33.73 0.61 32.56 0.57 33.03 0.52
White 26.99 0.48 32.55 0.51 32.36 0.52 32.44 0.51
Black 18.75 0.93 23.53 0.95 24.43 1.04 24.42 0.74
No children 24.24 0.57 30.91 0.65 31.04 0.67 31.01 0.66
1 child 28.70 0.92 31.46 0.74 30.86 0.72 31.06 0.71
2 children 28.14 0.86 33.40 0.76 33.10 0.76 33.42 0.76
3-4 children 26.73 1.13 30.22 0.93 30.47 0.97 30.44 0.95
Income - 1,100 14.50 1.47 14.10 1.40
Income - 6,400 24.87 1.05 24.79 1.01
Income - 19,000 32.91 0.69 32.93 0.68
Income - 54,000 32.46 0.42 32.63 0.42
Income - 145,000 32.02 0.41 32.18 0.41
Law 1 = no 27.35 0.67 33.67 0.70 31.43 0.59
Law 1 = yes 25.74 0.45 31.06 0.49 31.44 0.51
Law 2 = no 26.64 0.53 32.38 0.57 31.39 0.54
Law 2 = yes 25.65 0.46 30.99 0.50 31.46 0.52
In column A the regression is estimated in levels, while the other columns are estimated in log-levels. The
regression results are displayed in table 3.Table 4: cont. The Incidence of credit constraints by type of household.
Subgroup A B C D
constr. s.e. constr. s.e. constr. s.e. constr. s.e.
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Age 25 28.40 0.89 35.28 0.84
Age 30 27.06 0.61 32.71 0.60
Age 35 26.71 0.59 31.44 0.57
Age 40 26.39 0.63 30.87 0.60
Age 45 25.50 0.76 30.36 0.73
Age 50 21.66 0.80 27.80 0.87
Age 55 17.83 1.28 24.55 1.45
No college education:
Age 25 30.00 1.52 27.45 0.97
Age 30 31.00 0.99 29.47 0.73
Age 35 29.17 0.96 28.68 0.75
Age 40 26.51 0.96 26.49 0.77
Age 45 26.06 1.15 26.23 0.94
Age 50 25.96 1.28 26.89 1.16
Age 55 26.23 2.18 28.01 2.04
College education:
Age 25 39.13 0.94 40.00 0.96
Age 30 33.81 0.66 34.76 0.65
Age 35 32.25 0.67 32.08 0.59
Age 40 31.74 0.62 32.35 0.62
Age 45 32.45 0.82 32.31 0.74
Age 50 30.01 1.11 29.21 0.89
Age 55 25.13 0.19 24.21 1.44
1988 27.00 0.99 31.41 0.92 31.41 0.94 32.70 0.66
1989 27.83 1.04 34.54 0.96 34.06 0.95 31.56 0.57
1990 27.03 0.98 32.70 0.97 33.17 1.00 32.11 0.57
1991 26.00 0.92 31.87 0.84 31.66 0.82 31.51 0.54
1992 25.23 0.85 30.77 0.82 30.53 0.82 31.32 0.55
1993 23.31 0.86 27.92 0.78 28.08 0.79 29.70 0.61
In column A the regression is estimated in levels, while the other columns are estimated in log-levels. The
regression results are displayed in table 3.Table 5: The Marginal Incidence of credit constrained households.
Subgroup A B C D
constr. s.e. constr. s.e. constr. s.e. constr. s.e.
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Men 19.55 0.98 27.98 1.12 28.38 1.05 28.49 0.91
Women 25.23 1.28 33.82 1.29 33.73 1.17 33.50 1.02
Married 27.73 0.55 31.64 0.50 31.44 0.58 31.58 0.58
Some High School 13.57 0.96 24.72 1.22 25.86 1.37 25.53 0.94
Compl. High school 25.00 0.78 31.27 0.80 31.15 0.90 31.31 0.71
Some College 26.94 0.79 32.29 0.74 32.43 0.83 32.48 0.67
College degree 29.10 0.68 31.18 0.60 31.97 0.74 32.10 0.61
White 26.71 0.47 31.84 0.51 31.72 0.53 31.81 0.52
Black 20.44 0.98 27.95 1.00 28.54 1.03 28.53 0.75
No children 26.18 0.64 31.49 0.62 31.37 0.64 31.36 0.62
1 child 26.11 0.98 30.90 0.88 30.83 0.87 31.00 0.87
2 children 25.63 0.93 31.87 0.93 31.84 0.93 32.09 0.93
3-4 children 25.12 1.20 30.84 1.10 31.06 1.11 31.23 1.11
Income - 1,100 22.14 1.83 22.04 1.77
Income - 6,400 29.57 1.19 29.64 1.17
Income - 19,000 31.99 0.73 32.10 0.72
Income - 54,000 31.19 0.46 31.26 0.44
Income - 145,000 29.18 1.04 29.24 1.00
Law 1 = no 25.86 0.49 31.42 0.58 31.34 0.60 31.43 0.59
Law 1 = yes 25.98 0.45 31.43 0.49 31.37 0.51 31.44 0.51
Law 2 = no 25.84 0.46 31.25 0.51 31.21 0.53 31.39 0.54
Law 2 = yes 26.02 0.45 31.51 0.51 31.44 053 31.46 0.52
These numbers are calculated by holding all other variables at their observed level, and changing the relevant
variable to ‘male’, ‘female’ etc., and thus constructs the marginal eﬀect of the relevant variable. In column
A the regression is estimated in levels, while the other columns are estimated in log-levels. The regression
results are displayed in table 3.Table 5: cont. The Marginal Incidence of credit constrained households.
Subgroup A B C D
constr. s.e. constr. s.e. constr. s.e. constr. s.e.
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Age 25 28.94 1.26 33.50 1.10
Age 30 26.79 0.61 31.93 0.60
Age 35 26.09 0.63 31.28 0.62
Age 40 25.96 0.63 31.12 0.62
Age 45 25.49 0.79 30.96 0.76
Age 50 23.72 0.86 30.27 0.87
Age 55 19.70 1.78 28.40 1.88
No college education:
Age 25 31.91 2.27 30.49 1.49
Age 30 32.10 1.08 31.44 0.78
Age 35 31.65 0.86 31.41 0.71
Age 40 30.95 0.65 30.95 0.64
Age 45 30.40 0.95 30.64 0.86
Age 50 30.46 1.24 31.13 1.11
Age 55 31.61 2.81 33.17 2.53
College education:
Age 25 34.22 1.18 35.10 1.12
Age 30 31.46 0.75 31.90 0.68
Age 35 30.61 0.70 30.76 0.66
Age 40 30.95 0.65 30.95 0.64
Age 45 31.35 0.88 31.24 0.82
Age 50 30.65 1.21 30.28 0.99
Age 55 27.26 2.98 26.27 2.20
1988 27.18 1.12 31.31 1.01 31.20 1.03 31.40 0.57
1989 27.72 1.07 32.70 0.96 32.44 0.96 31.22 0.53
1990 26.83 0.98 31.91 0.96 32.04 1.00 31.67 0.57
1991 25.82 0.92 31.58 0.84 31.52 0.83 31.45 0.55
1992 25.08 0.87 31.06 0.85 30.91 0.85 31.47 0.54
1993 23.76 1.00 30.13 0.93 30.27 0.93 31.42 0.56
These numbers are calculated by holding all other variables at their observed level, and changing the relevant
variable to ‘male’, ‘female’ etc., and thus constructs the marginal eﬀect of the relevant variable. In column
A the regression is estimated in levels, while the other columns are estimated in log-levels. The regression
results are displayed in table 3.Table 6: Median demand and supply for credit.
Group A B C D
demand supply demand supply demand supply demand supply
All 1,580 2,060 1,400 2,175 1,425 2,248 1,436 2,243
Men 906 1,904 638 1,729 791 2,023 802 2,021
Women 1,037 1,862 1,643 1,607 1,902 1,968 1,865 2,021
Married 2,138 2,145 1,561 2,417 1,491 2,349 1,512 2,333
Some High School 0 2,039 289 1,826 460 2,098 448 2,243
Compl. High school 1,000 2,010 1,269 2,025 1,349 2,276 1,366 2,243
Some College 1,677 2,125 1,616 2,241 1,646 2,237 1,654 2,243
College degree 2,363 2,056 1,633 2,342 1,543 2,270 1,554 2,243
White 1,745 2,059 1,489 2,182 1,498 2,252 1,510 2.243
Black 261 2,063 734 2,127 858 2,219 861 2,243
No children 1,618 2,019 1,402 2,130 1,409 2,192 1,409 2,220
1 child 1,661 2,089 1,357 2,360 1,387 2,456 1,408 2,430
2 children 1,514 2,087 1,462 2,066 1,497 2,144 1,525 2,095
3-4 children 1,439 2,186 1,329 2,320 1,418 2,393 1,435 2,356
Income - 1,100 90 1,377 91 1,399
Income - 6,400 698 1,344 701 1,337
Income - 19,000 1,348 1,733 1,358 1,717
Income - 54,000 1,607 2,764 1,620 2,772
Income - 145,000 1,313 5,125 1,319 5,252
Law 1 = no 1,580 2,095 1,400 2,180 1,425 2,259 1,436 2,246
Law 1 = yes 1,580 2,054 1,400 2,175 1,425 2,246 1,436 2,243
Law 2 = no 1,580 2,103 1,400 2,277 1,425 2,332 1,436 2,268
Law 2 = yes 1,580 2,040 1,400 2,132 1,425 2,211 1,436 2,232
In column A the regression is estimated in levels, while the other columns are estimated in log-levels. The
regression results are displayed in table 3.Table 6: cont. Median demand and supply for credit.
Group A B C D
demand supply demand supply demand supply demand supply
Age 25 2,667 2,178 2,003 2,244
Age 30 1,836 2,111 1,542 2,240
Age 35 1,577 2,071 1,378 2,231
Age 40 1,514 2,042 1,330 2,198
Age 45 1,347 2,010 1,266 2,125
Age 50 841 1,961 1,076 1,998
Age 55 138 1,879 706 1,806
No college education:
Age 25 1,458 2,063 1,301 2,493
Age 30 1,558 2,166 1,481 2,380
Age 35 1,477 2,228 1,446 2,312
Age 40 1,320 2,241 1,314 2,243
Age 45 1,189 2,200 1,204 2,132
Age 50 1,161 2,100 1,218 1,944
Age 55 1,323 1,941 1,473 1,660
College education:
Age 25 2,606 2,745 2,837 2,493
Age 30 1,544 2,498 1,600 2,380
Age 35 1,290 2,356 1,297 2,312
Age 40 1,320 2,241 1,314 2,243
Age 45 1,343 2,090 1,329 2,132
Age 50 1,087 1,852 1,056 1,944
Age 55 474 1,497 424 1,660
1988 1,889 1,998 1,380 2,198 1,387 2,257 1,436 2,265
1989 2,109 2,037 1,700 2,128 1,683 2,225 1,436 2,364
1990 1,824 2,046 1,473 2,092 1,507 2,092 1,436 2,126
1991 1,521 2,057 1,433 2,173 1,468 2,269 1,436 2,236
1992 1,338 2,096 1,314 2,174 1,331 2,276 1,436 2,226
1993 986 2,105 1,152 2,273 1,218 2,344 1,436 2,254
In column A the regression is estimated in levels, while the other columns are estimated in log-levels. The
regression results are displayed in table 3.Table 7: How much extra do households wish to borrow?
Group A B C D
All 1,655 4,036 3,882 3,916
Men 1,065 2,033 2,190 2,221
Women 1,550 4,782 5,173 5,067
Married 1,840 4,320 3,958 4,026
Some High School 643 1,167 1,398 1,350
Compl. High school 1,530 3,627 3,613 3,657
Some College 1,736 4,493 4,416 4,429
College degree 1,961 4,513 4,132 4,416
White 1,724 4,231 4,050 4,088
Black 1,147 2,250 2,370 2,372
No children 1,674 4,047 3,846 3,845
1 child 1,675 3,810 3,738 3,805
2 children 1,626 4,224 4,095 4,191
3-4 children 1,584 3,810 3,832 3,891
Income - 1,100 538 527
Income - 6,380 2,115 2,122
Income - 11,160 3,728 3,763
Income - 54,000 4,202 4,238
Income - 145,000 3,358 3,375
In column A the regression is estimated in levels, while the other columns are estimated in log-levels. The
regression results are displayed in table 3.Table 7: How much extra do households wish to borrow?
Group A B C D
Age 25 1,987 5,586
Age 30 1,740 4,353
Age 35 1,663 3,917
Age 40 1,647 3,794
Age 45 1,597 3,638
Age 50 1,423 3,160
Age 55 1,077 2,222
No college education:
Age 25 3,935 3,416
Age 30 4,179 3,909
Age 35 3,945 3,829
Age 40 3,526 3,491
Age 45 3,187 3,222
Age 50 3,134 3,298
Age 55 3,602 4,086
College education:
Age 25 6,853 7,520
Age 30 4,072 4,226
Age 35 3,425 3,436
Age 40 3,526 3,491
Age 45 3,618 3,554
Age 50 2,992 2,871
Age 55 1,476 1,309
1988 1,771 3,952 3,755 3,912
1989 1,834 4,834 4,566 3,893
1990 1,740 4,228 4,119 3,941
1991 1,638 4,100 3,973 3,918
1992 1,569 3,779 3,601 3,920
1993 1,443 3,329 3,287 3,914
In column A the regression is estimated in levels, while the other columns are estimated in log-levels. The
regression results are displayed in table 3.